Reaffirming the Foundations of Rei Vindicatio and Prescription: A Critical Analysis of Nawalage Manel Mahendra Dias & Another v. Premalatha & Others
The Supreme Court’s judgment in SC Appeal No. 77/2019, delivered on 5 December 2025, stands out as a meticulously reasoned reaffirmation of several foundational principles of property law—particularly rei vindicatio, prescriptive title, and the nature of permissive possession. The Court, comprising Samayawardhena J., Abayakoon J., and presided by Wijeratne J., set aside the High Court’s decision and reinstated, with modification, the District Court’s judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs.
This case is a textbook illustration of how Sri Lankan courts approach disputes where parties seek to defeat paper title through claims of prescription—especially when the alleged possession originates from a defeasible or permissive character.
1. Background: From Partition to Litigation
The land in dispute—originally part of “Kathreege Kanaththa”—had been the subject of an earlier partition action. The 1st Plaintiff obtained Lot 4 in that partition, subsequently subdividing it into Lots A, B and C. Lot C was later gifted to the 2nd Plaintiff.
The Defendants were occupying the house on Lot C, admittedly with the permission of the late Beeta Manchanayake, the mother of the 1st Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs claimed that this permission continued as a license. The Defendants, however, denied being licensees and asserted that they had entered possession as prospective purchasers based on an informal sale agreement allegedly concluded in 1984. They claimed that after paying the full consideration of Rs. 240,000/-, they possessed the land adversely, thereby acquiring prescriptive title.
The District Court rejected the prescriptive claim, granted declaration of title and ejectment in favour of the Plaintiffs, and awarded the Defendants only a limited sum for improvements. The High Court reversed this, holding that prescription was established.
The Supreme Court granted leave to consider a single decisive question of law:
Did the High Court err in upholding the Defendants’ prescriptive claim?
2. The Court’s Framework: What Must a Plaintiff Prove?
The Supreme Court re-emphasised the classic requirements in a rei vindicatio action:
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Identity of the corpus
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Title of the plaintiff
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Possession by the defendant
Here, the identity of Lot C was expressly admitted at trial. Title of the 1st Plaintiff was also admitted. The Defendants were admittedly in possession.
With these three elements established, the legal burden shifted:
Once ownership is proved or admitted, the onus shifts to the defendant to show lawful possession or to establish prescription.
This is consistent with well-established authority, including Theivandran v. Ramanathan, Beebi Johara v. Warusavithana, Prasanth v. Devarajan, and many earlier decisions.
3. The Crumbling Foundation of the Prescriptive Claim
The Defendants’ defence rested on two pillars:
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An alleged agreement for sale
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Alleged payment of Rs. 240,000/-
Both pillars collapsed under scrutiny.
3.1 No Proof of Agreement or Payment
The plan allegedly drawn for the sale (Plan V2) was never proved.
The alleged written agreement was “lost”.
The alleged payments were unsupported by receipts, records, dates, or witnesses.
The only corroboration was a niece of Beeta Manchanayake, who admitted writing a receipt but could not confirm that any money was actually paid.
The Court found this inherently unreliable:
“It is hardly credible that a person would agree to purchase a property from someone who held only a life interest.”
3.2 Failure to Obtain Title Despite Alleged Full Payment
If the full price had been paid by 1990:
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Why was no conveyance sought?
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Why was no legal action filed?
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Why was no response made to the Plaintiffs’ notices to quit (P2–P6)?
The Defendants’ silence in response to termination notices was especially damaging, as Sri Lankan courts consistently regard such silence as inconsistent with a claim of independent title.
4. Permissive Possession Cannot Turn Secretly into Adverse Possession
The Court reaffirmed a core rule of prescription law:
Permissive possession, however long, does not become adverse without a clear, overt act of ouster brought to the owner’s knowledge.
As established in authority from Lebbe Marikar v. Sainu to Prasanth v. Devarajan:
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A licensee or prospective buyer enters in a defeasible character.
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Possession is presumed to continue in that character.
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Prescription does not run until the possessor performs an unequivocal act of ownership notorious to the true owner.
The Defendants showed no such act.
Therefore:
No prescriptive period ever began to run.
5. High Court’s Error and the Role of Sections 52 & 52A of the Partition Law
The Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs’ remedy lay under Sections 52 and 52A of the Partition Law, not through a vindicatory action.
The Supreme Court firmly rejected this:
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Section 52/52A provide speedier remedies, but do not bar a regular action.
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A registered owner is never precluded from vindicating title in a civil action.
This position is consistent with prior Supreme Court jurisprudence.
6. Improvements and Right of Retention
The District Court had awarded Rs. 22,717.50 with legal interest.
The Supreme Court upheld the award but removed the interest, noting:
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A defendant in permissive possession may have a right of retention for improvements.
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But such right does not carry entitlement to legal interest.
7. Final Outcome
The Supreme Court:
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Set aside the High Court judgment
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Affirmed the District Court judgment (with variation)
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Granted declaration of title and ejectment
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Allowed compensation for improvements (without interest)
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Dismissed the prescriptive claim
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Ordered each party to bear their own costs
It also answered the principal question of law in the affirmative—the High Court had indeed erred.
8. Significance of the Judgment
This judgment is particularly important for several reasons:
a) It reinforces the protective strength of registered and admitted title.
Once title is proved, the defendant’s burden becomes exceptionally heavy.
b) It sharply limits prescriptive claims based on alleged informal sales.
Courts will not allow unproven “agreements” to defeat ownership.
c) It provides clarity on permissive possession and its inability to morph into adverse possession without overt acts.
d) It preserves litigants’ freedom to choose between Partition Law remedies and regular civil actions.
e) It reflects a judicial commitment to prevent fraudulent appropriation of property through weak, uncorroborated narratives of purchase and long occupation.
Conclusion
The decision in SC Appeal No. 77/2019 is a powerful reaffirmation of the core doctrines governing immovable property in Sri Lanka. It underscores a simple but fundamental truth:
Long possession alone is not enough—possession must be adverse, open, and unequivocal if it is to ripen into title.
Where possession begins as permissive or subordinate—as in this case—courts will demand strict proof before allowing prescription to override registered ownership.
For judges, practitioners, and scholars, the judgment offers a carefully reasoned roadmap through the complexities of vindicatory actions, prescriptive claims, and the evidentiary burdens that govern them.
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